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Quantum key distribution (QKD) can share an unconditional secure key between two
remote parties, but the deviation between theory and practice will break the security of the
generated key. In this paper, we evaluate the security of QKD with weak basis-choice flaws,
in which the random bits used by Alice and Bob are weakly controlled by Eve. Based on
the definition of Li et al. [Sci. Rep. 5, 16200 (2015)] and GLLP’s analysis, we obtain a tight
and analytical bound to estimate the phase error and key rate for both the single photon
source and the weak coherent source. Our approach largely increases the key rate from that
of the original approach. Finally, we investigate and confirm the security of BB84-QKD with
a practical commercial devices.
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2I. INTRODUCTION
Based on the principle of quantum mechanics, “quantum cryptography” is a possible means of
implementing unconditional secure communication. One famous quantum cryptography approach
is quantum key distribution (QKD) combined with One-Time pad. Since the proposal of the first
QKD protocol BB84 [1], QKD has attracted much interest. The unconditional security of QKD had
been proven in both perfect [2] and imperfect [3, 4] devices. QKD has also been experimentally
demonstrated in fibers [5, 6], free space [7, 8], and satellites [9, 10]. Multi-user quantum networks
based on these results have become available in many countries [11–14].
However, because practical devices are imperfect, some assumptions of the theoretical analysis
may be violated in practical situations. If the gap between theory and practice is exploited by
an eavesdropper (Eve), the security of the final key may be broken. In fact, many loopholes
have been discovered in practical QKD systems [15–21]. These loopholes are closed by two main
approaches: device-independent QKD protocols and security patches. The former include full-
device-independent QKD [22, 23], measurement-device-independent QKD [24, 25], and semi-device-
independent QKD [26]. Security patches account for the parameters of practical devices (as many
as possible) in the security model. Although device-independent QKD can remove all or a portion
of the loopholes, the task remains technologically challenging, especially in practical commercial
QKD networks. Thus, most practical QKD systems implement security patches.
In the BB84 protocol, both Alice and Bob must determine how to prepare and measure the
quantum states. For this purpose, they require random bits. In practical situations, the random bits
may be weakly known or controlled by Eve, and the security of the generated key is compromised.
A typical attack that exploits the weak randomness of QKD is wavelength attack [16, 17]. The
security of QKD with weak randomness was first studied by Li et al. [27], and has since been
applied to different cases [28, 29]. In Li’s analysis, if the legitimate parties use the “one-step post
processing method” to distill the final key, even a small degree of non-randomness will rapidly
reduce the final key rate. The key rate can be improved if the legitimate parties adopt the “two-
step post processing method”, or biased basis protocol, in which Alice and Bob distill the key from
the rectilinear and diagonal bases, respectively. However, to maximize Eve’s information, they
must perform global optimization, which is hampered by at least two disadvantages: large time
cost and convergence to a local optimum. The time cost is incurred by the complexity or cost
of post processing, and local (rather than global) optimization compromises the security of the
generated key.
3To mitigate these problems, we develop an analytical formula that estimates the key rate for both
the single photon source (SPS) and the weak coherent source (WPS). In numerical simulations, our
method significantly increased the key rate over the original method of Li et al. [27]. For example,
the original method of Ref. [27] can generate no secure key for a SPS with a basis-choice flaw of
0.1 when the bit error rate exceeds 3.4%, but our method achieves a final key rate of 0.45 under
these conditions. Furthermore, to evaluate the performance of QKD under wavelength attack, we
also estimate the key rate of a practical QKD system with a passive basis-choice.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Sec. II briefly reviews the analysis of Li
et al. [27], and Sec. III derives our tight bound for estimating Eve’s information with one-step
post processing. In this section, we also compare our results with those of Ref. [27]. And we test
a commercial BS to evaluate the security of QKD with a passive basis-choice. Sec. IV applies our
analysis to the biased-based QKD protocol. Discussion and conclusions are presented in Sec. V.
II. WEAK RANDOMNESS AND ONE-STEP POST PROCESSING
This section briefly reviews the analysis of Ref. [27]. Alice determines her quantum state from
two random bits: x0 for bit and x1 for basis. Meanwhile, Bob chooses his basis from a random
bit, y. As the final key is distilled only when Alice and Bob choose the same basis (x1 = y), the
following analysis is limited to the case x1 = y. In a practical QKD system, x0 (x1) may be weakly
controlled by Eve with a hidden variable λ0 (λ1). Setting k and k
′ = [0, 1] as the values of x0 and
x1, respectively, the probabilities of obtaining x0 = k and x1 = k
′ are respectively given by
p (x0 = k) =
∑
i
pλ0=ip (x0 = k|λ0 = i) ,
p
(
x1 = k
′) =∑
j
pλ1=jp
(
x1 = k
′|λ1 = j
)
.
(1)
Here
∑
i pλ0=i =
∑
j pλ1=j = 1. Due to the existence of the hidden variable λ0, we cannot guarantee
that p(x0 = 0|λ0 = i) = p(x0 = 1|λ0 = i) = 1/2 holds for all i, even if p(x0 = 0) = p(x0 = 1) = 1/2
holds. The same conclusion is reached for p(x1 = k
′). To evaluate the weak randomness of x0 and
x1, the deviations is defined as ∣∣∣∣p (x0 = k|λ0 = i)− 12
∣∣∣∣ ≤ ε0,∣∣∣∣p (x1 = k′|λ1 = j)− 12
∣∣∣∣ ≤ ε1,
(2)
respectively. Here, 0 ≤ ε0, ε1 ≤ 1 define the amount of prior information known to Eve.
4When the hidden variables λ0 = i and λ1 = j are given, the quantum state shared by Alice and
Bob can be written as [27]
ρi,jAB =
∑
µ,ν
qµ,ν
{
p (x1 = 0|λ1 = j) I ⊗XµZν |ϕ〉
〈
ϕ|λ0=i ZνXµ ⊗ I
+ p (x1 = 1|λ1 = j) I ⊗HXµZνH|ϕ〉
〈
ϕ|λ0=iHZνXµH ⊗ I
}
,
(3)
with
|ϕ〉λ0=i =
√
p (x0 = 0|λ0 = i)|00〉 +
√
p (x0 = 1|λ0 = i)|11〉. (4)
Here, µ, ν ∈ {0, 1}, and qµ,ν is the probability that Eve performs different operators on the quantum
state |ϕ〉λ0=i. These probabilities satisfy
∑
µ,ν qµ,ν = 1. I is the unity matrix, X and Z are Pauli
matrices, and H = 1√
2

1 1
1 −1

.
In the following, we first discuss the case of SPS, then expand our results to WPS. In SPS, the
total key rate is given by
R ≥
∑
i,j
pλ0=ipλ1=jR
i,j. (5)
The key rate for a given i, j is
Ri,jsps ≥ 1−H(ei,jphase)−H(ei,jbit), (6)
where ei,jbit (e
i,j
phase) is the bit error (phase error) of the given i, j. Because an experiment reveals
only the total bit error ebit =
∑
i,j pλ0=ipλ1=je
i,j
bit, Eq. 5 can be rewritten as
Rsps =
∑
i,j
pλ0=ipλ1=j
[
1−H(ei,jphase)−H(ei,jbit)
]
≥ 1−H(
∑
i,j
pλ0=ipλ1=je
i,j
phase)−H(ebit)
≡ 1−H(ephase)−H(ebit).
(7)
Here ephase is the total phase error, and the second inequality uses the Jensen inequality because
H(x) is concave. Before obtaining the lower bound of the key rate, we should estimate the upper
bound of ephase. The authors of [27] proved that for the density matrix given by Eq. 3, the upper
bound of the phase error can be written as
ei,jphase ≤ ei,jbit + δ,
ephase =
∑
i,j
pλ0=ipλ1=je
i,j
phase ≤
∑
i,j
pλ0=ipλ1=je
i,j
bit + δ = ebit + δ,
(8)
5where
δ = max
{
δ0 ≡ 1
2
−
√
1
4
− ε20, δ1 ≡ 2ε1
}
. (9)
The final key rate of a SPS (Eq. 7) is then rewritten as
Rosps ≥ 1−H(ebit + δ)−H(ebit). (10)
In this expression, the superscript o distinguishes the original method from our proposed method,
which is introduced later. Most practical QKD systems use a WPS. Following GLLP’s analysis [30],
the key rate of Eq. 5 is then written as
Rowps ≥
∑
i,j
pλ0=ipλ1=jR
i,j
≥
∑
i,j
pλ0=ipλ1=j
{
−Qi,js f(Ei,js,bit)H(Ei,js,bit) +Qi,js,1
[
1−H(ei,j
1,bit + δ)
]}
≥ −Qsf(Es)H(
∑
i,j
pλ0=ipλ1=jE
i,j
s,bit) +Qs,j

1−H(∑
i,j
pλ0=ipλ1=je
i,j
1,bit + δ)


≡ −Qsf(Es,bit)H(Es,bit) +Qs,1[1−H(e1,bit + δ)].
(11)
Here the subscript s denotes the key generated from the signal state with intensity s. Qi,js (E
i,j
s,bit) is
the total gain (bit error) for a given i, j, and Qi,js,1 (e
i,j
1,bit) is the yield (bit error) of the single photon
pulse for the given i, j. The terms Qs =
∑
i,j pλ0=ipλ1=jQ
i,j
s (Qs,1 =
∑
i,j pλ0=ipλ1=jQ
i,j
s,1) and
Es,bit =
∑
i,j pλ0=ipλ1=jE
i,j
s,bit (e1,bit =
∑
i,j pλ0=ipλ1=je
i,j
1,bit) are the total gain and error, respec-
tively, for all i, j. f(Es,bit) = f(E
i,j
s,bit) = 1.22 is the efficiency of the error correction, which can be
considered constant. In the third inequality, we recognize that Qs ≥ Qi,js ≥ 0 and Qs,1 ≥ Qi,js,1 ≥ 0
for all i, j. The gain Qs and error Es,bit in the equality can be directly measured in experiments,
and the contributions of the single photon pulse (Qs,1 and e1,bit) should be estimated by the decoy
state method [31–33].
III. OUR METHOD WITH ONE-STEP POST PROCESSING
In this section, we show that the upper bound of the phase error (Eq. 8) is suboptimal, and that
the key rate can be improved by imposing a tight bound. Given the density matrix ρi,jAB (Eq. 3),
6the bit error rate and phase error rate are respectively written as
ei,jbit = 〈φ2|ρi,jAB|φ2〉+ 〈φ4|ρi,jAB |φ4〉 = q01p(x1 = 1|λ1 = j) + q10p(x1 = 0|λ1 = j) + q11
≥
(
1
2
− ε1
)
(q01 + q10) + q11 ≡ ei,jbit,low,
ei,jphase = 〈φ3|ρi,jAB|φ3〉+ 〈φ4|ρi,jAB |φ4〉
= q00δ0 + q11(1− δ0) + q01
{
1
2
+ [p(x1 = 0|λ1 = j)− p(x1 = 1|λ1 = j)] (1
2
− δ0)
}
+ q10
{
1
2
+ [p(x1 = 1|λ1 = j)− p(x1 = 0|λ1 = j)](1
2
− δ0)
}
.
(12)
Here, |φ1〉 = (|00〉+|11〉)/
√
2, |φ2〉 = (|01〉+|10〉)/
√
2,|φ3〉 = (|00〉−|11〉)/
√
2,|φ4〉 = (|01〉−|10〉)/
√
2
are the four Bell states. Thus we have
eijphase − ei,jbit = q00δ0 − q11δ0 + (q01 − q10)(1− δ0)[2p(x1 = 0|λ1 = j)− 1]
≤ q00δ0 + q11δ0 + 2ε1q01 + 2ε1q10
= (q00 + q11)δ0 + 2ε1
ei,jbit,low − q11
1/2− ε1
=
4ε1
1− 2ε1 e
i,j
bit,low − q11
4ε1
1− 2ε1 + (q00 + q11)δ0
≤ 4ε1
1− 2ε1 e
i,j
bit + δ0,
(13)
where δ0 is defined in Eq. 9, and 0 ≤ qµν ≤ 1 for all qµν . Thus, the upper bound of the phase error
can be written as
ei,jphase ≤
1 + 2ε1
1− 2ε1 e
i,j
bit +
1
2
−
√
1
4
− ε20. (14)
Submitting the above inequality into Eq. 5 and applying the method described in Sec. II, the final
key rate is rewritten as
Rt ≥


1−H
(
1+2ε1
1−2ε1 ebit + δ0
)
−H(ebit) for SPS
−Qsf(Es,bit)H(Es,bit) +Qs,1
[
1−H
(
1+2ε1
1−2ε1 e1,bit + δ0
)]
for WPS
. (15)
Fig. 1 compares the numerical simulation results of the method in Ref. [27] (Eq. 10 and Eq. 11)
and our method (Eq. 15). Our method significantly improved the key rate for both SPS and WPS
(the simulation method is given in Appendix A). For example, in the SPS case with ε0 = ε1 = 0.1,
the maximal tolerable error rate was only 3.4% in the method of Ref. [27], but was increased to
8.5% by our method. In the WPS case with ε0 = ε1 = 0.1, no secure key was generated by the
method in Ref. [27], but a final key of fiber length 132 km was generated by our method.
7TABLE I. Key rates estimated by our method. Here γ = (Rideal − Rprac)/Ridealdefines the practical key
rate (Rprac) relative to the ideal key rate without basis-choice flaws (Rideal). In the simulations, we set
ε0 = 0, and the other parameters were those assumed in Fig. 1.
T −5◦ 18◦ 25◦ 40◦ 70◦
ε1 0.0253 0.0235 0.0250 0.0274 0.0275
γ (SPS)@ebit = 3% 0.0259 0.0239 0.0255 0.0281 0.0282
γ (SPS)@ebit = 5% 0.0521 0.0482 0.0514 0.0566 0.0567
γ (SPS)@ebit = 7% 0.1017 0.0941 0.1004 0.1105 0.1108
γ (WPS)@L = 10km 0.0445 0.0411 0.0438 0.0483 0.0484
γ (WPS)@L = 50km 0.0454 0.0420 0.0448 0.0493 0.0495
γ (WPS)@L = 100km 0.0548 0.0507 0.0541 0.0596 0.0597
To evaluate the security of practical QKD with weak randomness flaws, we test the performance
of commercial BS which may suffer from the wavelength attack. The experimental scheme and
results are given in Appendix B, and the estimated key rate is listed in Tab. I.
IV. BIASED BASE QKD PROTOCOL
In some practical QKD systems, two bases (Z and X) can deliver different gain or error rate
performances. Therefore, to improve the total key rate, we let Alice and Bob observe bases Z and
X, respectively. In this section, we analyze the security of biased base QKD with weak randomness.
When Alice and Bob distill the key from their respective bases, the key rate becomes
RtwoSPS ≥ prec[1−H(ebrec)−H(eprec)] + pdia[1−H(ebdia)−H(epdia)]. (16)
Here ebrec and e
p
rec (ebdia and e
p
dia) are the bit error and phase error rates, respectively, in the
rectilinear (diagonal) basis. Their values are given by
eprec =
prec1eb01 + prec2eb11
prec
+
1
2
−
√
−ǫ20 +
1
4
,
epdia =
pdialeb00 + pdia2eb10
pdia
+
1
2
−
√
−ǫ20 +
1
4
ebrec =
prec1eb00 + prec2eb10
prec
,
ebdia =
pdial, eb01 + pdia2eb11
Pdia
.
(17)
8In these expressions, eb00 and eb01 (eb10 and eb11) are the bit error rates in the rectilinear and
diagonal bases, respectively, given a hidden variable λ1 = 0 (λ1 = 1). prec and pdia are the
probabilities that Bob obtains the outcome in the rectilinear and diagonal bases, respectively.
They are calculated as
prec = prec1 + prec2, pdia = pdia1 + pdia2, (18)
respectively, where prec1 = pλ1=0p (x1 = 0|λ1 = 0), prec2 = pλ1=1p (x1 = 0|λ1 = 1), pdia1 =
pλ1=0p (x1 = 1|λ1 = 0), and pdia2 = pλ1=1p (x1 = 1|λ1 = 1).
As the bit error rates ebrec and e
b
dai can be directly measured in experiments, we need only to
estimate the upper bounds of the phase error rates eprec and e
p
dai. Using Eq. 17, the phase error
eprec becomes
eprec = e
b
dia
pdia
prec
prec1eb01 + prec2eb11
pdia1eb01 + pdia2eb11
+ δ0
= ebdia
pdia
prec
pλ1=0p(x1 = 0|λ1 = 0)eb01 + pλ1=1p(x1 = 0|λ1 = 1)eb11
pλ1=0p(x1 = 1|λ1 = 0)eb01 + pλ1=1p(x1 = 1|λ1 = 1)eb11
+ δ0
≤ ebdia
pdia(1/2 + ε1)
prec(1/2 − ε1) + δ0.
(19)
By the above method, we also obtain
epdia ≤ ebrec
prec(1/2 + ε1)
pdia(1/2 − ε1) + δ0. (20)
Equation 16 can then be written as
RtwoSPS ≥ prec
{
1−H(ebrec)−H
[
ebdia
pdia(1/2 + ε1)
prec(1/2 − ε1) + δ0
]}
+ pdia
{
1−H(ebdia)−H
[
ebrec
prec(1/2 + ε1)
pdia(1/2 − ε1)
+ δ0
]}
.
(21)
Applying the method of Sec.III and GLLP’s analysis, the key rate given by Eq. 21 can be
expanded to the WPS case as follows:
Rtwowps ≥ prec
{
−Qs,recf(Ebs,rec)H(Ebs,rec) +Q1,rec
[
1−H(eb1,dia
pdia(1/2 + ε0)
prec(1/2 − ε1) + δ0)
]}
+ pdia
{
−Qs,diaf(Ebs,dia)H(Ebs,dia) +Q1,dia
[
1−H(eb1,rec
prec(1/2 + ε0)
pdia(1/2 − ε1) + δ0)
]}
,
(22)
where Qs,rec (Qs,rec) and E
b
s,dia (E
b
s,dia) denote the total gain and bit error rate, respectively, in
the rectilinear (diagonal) base, and Q1,rec (Q1,rec) and e
b
1,dia (e
b
1,dia) are the gain and bit error rate,
respectively, of a single photon pulse in the rectilinear (diagonal) base.
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FIG. 1. Key rates in the original analysis [27] (red lines) and the method proposed in this paper (blue
lines). Results are plotted for SPS (left) and WPS (right). The black solid line is the result of the ideal
case without basis-choice flaws. To simplify the simulation, we assume ε0 = ε1 and infinite decoy states.
The WPS case employs the experimental results of GYS [30]; thus, the signal state intensity is s = 0.48 and
the other parameters are set as follows: dark count rate Y0 = 1.7 × 10−6, background error rate e0 = 0.5,
fiber loss 0.21 dB/km, Bob’s transmittance ηBob = 0.045, and error rate of optical devices edet = 3.3%. The
method of Ref. [27] generates no key in the case of WPS with ε0 = ε1 = 0.1.
V. CONCLUSIONS
We evaluated the security of QKD with weak basis-choice flaws. The previous analysis of Li et
al. [27] was extended by applying a tight analytical bound for estimating the phase error. The final
key rate was significantly improved by the proposed approach. For example, when ε0 = ε1 = 0.1
and the bit error rate exceeded 3.4%, no final key was generated by the previous method, but a
final key rate of 0.45 was achieved by our method. Applying our analysis, we evaluated the security
of a practical QKD system in which Bob passively chooses his basis with a BS. In experiments
using a practical BS with typical parameters, the key rate was reduced by less than 6%. Thus, the
proposed method improves the QKD performance even in weak randomness scenarios.
VI. ACKNOWLEDGMENT
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Appendix A: Formulations of simulation
This Appendix shows the simulation formulations of Fig. 1 and Table I. In the absence of Eve,
the total gain and error rate are respectively written as
Qω = 1− (1− Y0)e−ωη
andEωQω = e0Y0 + edet(1− e−ωη).
(A1)
Here, ω ∈ {s} and ω ∈ {d} are the intensities of the signal state (s) and decoy state (d), respectively,
Y0 is the dark count of the single photon detector, and e0 is the background error rate. η is the
total transmittance of the system, which is given by
η = ηBob10
−α/10. (A2)
In this expression, ηBob is the transmittance of Bob’s optical devices and the efficiency of single-
photon detectors, and α is the channel loss. In QKD with a weak coherent source, photon-number-
dependent attacks (such as photon-number splitting attacks) must be removed by the decoy state
method. Assuming that Alice and Bob use infinite decoy states, the gain and quantum bit error
rate of a single photon pulse are respectively given by
Qs,1 = se
−s[1− (1− Y0)(1− η)] ≡ se−sY1,
e1 = (e0Y0 + edetη)/Y1.
(A3)
Appendix B: Experiment
In some practical QKD systems, Bob passively chooses his measured basis with a BS. Because
this scheme requires no active modulator, it enables high-speed, low-cost, and low-complexity
operations. However, (as is well known) the transmittance of the BS may depend on the wavelength
of the light, opening a potential loophole for wavelength attack by Eve [16, 17]. In this section, we
evaluate the performance of QKD with a passive BS by the above analysis.
The experimental scheme is shown in the left panel of Fig. 2. The BS was encased in a tem-
perature box that controlled its working temperature. The input of the BS was a tunable laser
(model JW3113; province, country), and the light output was measured by a dual-channel power
meter (model JW8103D, province, country). In a perfect BS, the measured power of both power
meters is identical. The performance of a real BS is defined by its deviation ratio as follows:
∆(T, λ) =
P0(T, λ)
P1(T, λ)
. (B1)
11
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FIG. 2. Experimental scheme (left) and measured deviation ratio (right) of a practical commercial BS that
evaluates the key rate under a weak measured basis flaw. The deviation ratio is determined by Eq. B1 and
T is the working temperature of the BS, which is controlled by the temperature box.
Here, P0 and P1 are the powers of the light measured by the two optical power meters, T is the
working temperature of the BS, and λ is the wavelength of the input light.
The measured deviation ratio of the BS was measured at different wavelengths of the input light
and different working temperatures. The results are shown in the right panel of Fig. 2. From the
experimental results, the weak randomness in Bob’s basis-choice can be estimated as
ε1 = max
λ
∣∣∣∣ P0P0 + P1 −
1
2
∣∣∣∣ = maxλ
∣∣∣∣ ∆1 +∆ − 12
∣∣∣∣ . (B2)
The estimated key rates in the SPS and WPS cases are listed in Table I (see main text). At
communication distances smaller than 100 km, the key rate was reduced by less than 6%.
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